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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
COLLIN SKIP H. FUKUJI,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NOS. 48640-2021 & 48641-2021
CASSIA COUNTY NOS. CR16-20-3935
& CR16-20-3977
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Collin Skip H. Fukuji, pursuant to plea agreements in two separate cases, pleaded guilty
to, respectively, eluding a peace officer and leaving the scene of an injury accident. The district
court imposed two consecutive unified sentences of five years, with one year fixed. While
Mr. Fukuji recommended that the district court place him on probation, the district court retained
jurisdiction. In this consolidated appeal, Mr. Fukuji asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by retaining jurisdiction when it imposed his sentences, instead of placing him
on probation.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Fukuji had two children with his ex-wife, but he reported they divorced after they fell
out of love. (See Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.)1 Although he had
been sober for thirteen years, Mr. Fukuji stated that he relapsed into drug use following the
divorce. (See PSI, pp.9-10.) He had been self-medicating at work and “didn’t know how to deal
with it.” (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Fukuji was fired from his job as an electrical foreman with Kodiak
America for attendance and drug issues. (See PSI, p.10.)
One day a few months after the firing, Cassia County Sheriff’s Office Sergeant Murphy
was conducting surveillance on Mr. Fukuji. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Fukuji was in a white Subaru car,
registered to Jorge Sierra and parked in Mr. Sierra’s alley. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Sierra had active drug
cases and a felon in possession of a firearm case. (See PSI, p.2.)
Two days earlier, Sergeant Murphy had seen Mr. Fukuji in the same white car, parked
outside Gary Osterhout’s house. (See PSI, p.2.) Mr. Osterhout had an active drug case. (See
PSI, p.2.) At that time, Sergeant Murphy and a detective saw Esequiel Delacruz, a parolee, walk
over to the car and speak with Mr. Fukuji. (See PSI, p.2.) The following day, another detective
saw Mr. Fukuji in the white car, parked at a house in Heyburn that was part of an active federal
drug trafficking investigation. (See PSI, p.2.) Earlier in the day when Sergeant Murphy was
conducting surveillance, Detective Potter had seen Mr. Fukuji in the white car at Jose Garza’s
house. (See PSI, p.3.) Mr. Garza had pending drug charges. (See PSI, p.3.)
Sergeant Murphy also learned that Mr. Fukuji had recently been charged in Nevada with
drug trafficking. (PSI, p.3.) Additionally, the sergeant knew that Mr. Fukuji was the subject of a
protection order covering his ex-wife, after he reportedly used or had a firearm during a domestic
1

All citations to “PSI” refer to the 38-page PDF version of the Presentence Investigation Report
and its attachments.
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dispute. (See PSI, p.3.) Further, Mr. Fukuji was the suspect in a possible threat report, where he
commented he had purchased an AR-15 rifle. (See PSI, p.3.)
While Sergeant Murphy was conducting surveillance, an SUV pulled up into the alley
behind Mr. Fukuji’s car, and a male got out and walked into the backyard. (See PSI, p.3.) The
SUV left soon thereafter, and officers stopped the SUV for a traffic infraction and found
methamphetamine during the traffic stop. (See PSI, p.3.)
A man who appeared to be Mr. Fukuji got in the driver’s seat of the white car, and the car
drove through the alley and turned onto the street without using a turn signal. (See PSI, p.3.)
Sergeant Murphy followed the white car to Mr. Osterhout’s residence, where he had seen the car
before. (See PSI, p.3.) Mr. Fukuji parked in the alley next to the residence, and a male believed
to be Mr. Delacruz walked over and talked to him. (See PSI, p.3.) A few minutes later,
Mr. Fukuji left the alley without using a turn signal. (See PSI, p.3.)
When Sergeant Murphy attempted to stop Mr. Fukuji, he did not pull over. (See PSI,
p.3.) Sergeant Murphy then pursued Mr. Fukuji for about seventeen minutes. (See PSI, p.3.)
During the pursuit, Mr. Fukuji threw two items which appeared to be clear baggies out of the car,
but the police did not recover those items. (See PSI, p.3.) Mr. Fukuji also passed a semi-truck
on the right-hand side by driving through the grass borrow pit at about 60 mph, and ran
numerous stoplights and stop signs. (See PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Fukuji attempted to pass a blue car when the car was slowing to turn into the Burley
Junior High School. (See PSI, pp.3, 5.) He hit the rear of the blue car with the front of his car.
(PSI, pp.3, 5.) The driver and a juvenile passenger in the blue car were taken to the hospital.
(See PSI, p.5.) Mr. Fukuji did not stop after the collision. (See PSI, p.3.) He drove to Kodiak’s
building, before parking and running inside. (See PSI, p.3.) Sergeant Murphy and a deputy
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found Mr. Fukuji in an office and took him into custody. (See PSI, p.3.) Mr. Fukuji’s ex-wife,
covered by the protection order, was one of the employees at Kodiak who told Sergeant Murphy
which direction Mr. Fukuji had run. (See PSI, pp.3-4.)
The deputy transported Mr. Fukuji to the Mini-Cassia Jail.

(See PSI, p.4.)

An

unidentified male approached Sergeant Murphy and reported that Mr. Fukuji had thrown a black
case to another employee, and the employee had hidden the case on a shelf. (PSI, p.4.) Sergeant
Murphy received the case from that employee. (See PSI, p.4.) Inside the case, the sergeant
found two glass pipes with white residue, and a clear baggie containing a white crystal-like
substance that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (See PSI, p.4.)
Officers conducting an impound inventory of the white car found a loaded AR-15 rifle,
loaded magazines for the rifle, a handgun, loaded magazines for the handgun, and other
weapons. (See PSI, p.4.) They also found a digital scale with residue, clear baggies, and items
of mail bearing Mr. Fukuji’s name. (See PSI, p.4.)
In Cassia County No. CR16-20-3935 (hereinafter, the eluding case), the State charged
Mr. Fukuji by Information with felony fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, possession
of a controlled substance, and concealment or destruction of evidence, as well as misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use, and resisting and obstructing officers.
(No. 48640 R., pp.23-26.) In Cassia County No. CR16-20-3977 (hereinafter, the leaving the
scene case), the State charged Mr. Fukuji with felony leaving the scene of an injury accident.
(No. 48641 R., pp.25-27.) Mr. Fukuji entered not guilty pleas in both cases. (No. 46840
R., pp.35-36; No. 46841 R., pp.29-30.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Fukuji agreed to plead guilty to eluding a peace officer
in the eluding case, and the State agreed to dismiss the other charges. (No. 46840 R., pp.40-52.)
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The State would recommend a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed. (No. 46840
R., p.41.) In the leaving the scene case, Mr. Fukuji agreed to plead guilty to leaving the scene of
an injury accident, and the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of five years, with one
year fixed, to run consecutively to the sentence in the eluding case. (No. 46841 R., pp.34-46.)
In both cases, the State would argue for no more than a period of retained jurisdiction, and
Mr. Fukuji would be free to recommend probation. (See 11/9/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-23.) The district
court accepted Mr. Fukuji’s pleas in both cases. (11/9/20 Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.18, L.1.)
At the sentencing hearing, the parties informed the district court that Mr. Fukuji’s
pending case in Nevada would conclude after the resolution of the instant cases. (See 1/11/21
Tr., p.12, Ls.19-25, p.17, Ls.3-11.) The State recommended that the district court “follow the
plea agreement in both cases. In 3977, a five-year unified sentence with the first year fixed,
indeterminate. And in the 3935 case, a five-year unified sentence with the first year fixed,
indeterminate; with both of those terms running concurrent—I believe was our agreement.”
(1/11/21 Tr., p.13, Ls.19-25.) Based on the plea agreement, the State also recommended “a
period of retained jurisdiction for both of these cases.” (1/11/21 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-11.)
Mr. Fukuji’s counsel recommended that the district court “follow the plea agreement. As
far as the sentences go, I think those are very fair recommendations. I think that’s a fair
resolution of the case.” (1/11/21 Tr., p.19, Ls.4-7.) Defense counsel further asked the district
court “to place him on probation, knowing that Nevada is now going to take him and he’s going
to be down there for a while.” (1/11/21 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-10.)
In the eluding case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one
year fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (No. 46840 R., pp.67-70.) In the leaving the scene case,
the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, to be served
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consecutively to the sentence in the eluding case, and retained jurisdiction.

(No. 46841

R., pp.57-60.)
In each case, Mr. Fukuji filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment of
Conviction, Retained Jurisdiction. (No. 46840 R., pp.85-87, 101-05; No. 46841 R., pp.70-72,
87-91.)2 The Idaho Supreme Court ordered that the two appeals be consolidated. (No. 46840
R., p.106; No. 46841 R., p.92.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction, instead of placing Mr. Fukuji
on probation, when it imposed his two consecutive unified sentences of five years, with one year
fixed, after his guilty pleas to eluding a peace officer and leaving the scene of an injury accident?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Retaining Jurisdiction, Instead Of Placing
Mr. Fukuji On Probation, When It Imposed His Two Consecutive Unified Sentences Of Five
Years, With One Year Fixed, After His Guilty Pleas
Mr. Fukuji asserts that the district court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction,
instead of placing him on probation, when it imposed his two consecutive unified sentences of
five years, with one year fixed.
“The choice of probation, among the available sentencing alternatives, is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hostetler, 124 Idaho 191, 192 (Ct. App. 1993)
(per curiam) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)). In reviewing a district
court’s discretionary decision, an appellate court conducts an inquiry into “[w]hether the trial
2

Mr. Fukuji also filed, in each case, an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence. (No. 46840 R., pp.88-89; No. 46841 R., pp.73-74.) The district court denied the Rule
35 motions, after determining that Mr. Fukuji “has provided the Court with no new information
to support his motion that was not previously provided to the Court.” (No. 46840 R., pp.97-98;
No. 46841 R., pp.83-84.) On appeal, Mr. Fukuji does not challenge the district court’s decisions
to deny his Rule 35 motions.
6

court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). “The denial of probation will not be deemed an abuse of
discretion if the decision is consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.” Hostetler,
124 Idaho at 192. Idaho Code Section 19-2521 lists the factors a court should accord weight to
in determining whether to place a defendant on probation.
Mr. Fukuji asserts that the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards, because the district court did not adequately consider mitigating factors. For example,
the district court did not give adequate consideration to the fact that the instant offenses are
Mr. Fukuji’s first felony convictions. One of the Section 19-2521 factors to be accorded weight
in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment is, “The defendant has no history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time
before the commission of the present crime.” I.C. § 19-2521(2)(g). The Idaho Supreme Court
has “recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the
habitual criminal.” E.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (quoting State v. Owen, 73
Idaho 394, 402 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As of the time of sentencing, while
Mr. Fukuji had pending felony charges in Nevada, the only other offense on his prior record was
a misdemeanor petit theft case that was closed in 2010. (See PSI, pp.12-13.)
Moreover, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Fukuji’s remorse and
acceptance of responsibility. Another Section 19-2521 factor that weighs in favor of probation is,
“The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the commission of another crime is
unlikely.” I.C. § 19-2521(2)(i). During the presentence investigation, Mr. Fukuji stated, “I
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regret every decision I made this day.” (PSI, p.6.) He reported that he was having a bad time
with his divorce, and got into methamphetamine and other drugs. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Fukuji stated
that he panicked when law enforcement attempted to pull him over.

(PSI, p.6.) He also

explained, “When I was detained and they told me it was kids in the car I hit, it wrecked me
when they told me what happened. . . . I kept inquiring how they were. They were okay
thankfully.” (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Fukuji continued, “When they brought me in I was in holding for
three days. I broke down and cried. My actions and what they caused.” (PSI, p.6.)
An additional factor the district court did not adequately consider was Mr. Fukuji’s
support from his friends and family, which further reflects on his character. For instance,
Mr. Fukuji’s parents wrote, “Collin has the love and support from his family, but it is up to
Collin to trust and believe in himself and doing the right things right.” (PSI, p.17.) His current
wife stated, “My husband deserves the chance to prove that he is not the kind of person to do the
things he did.” (PSI, p.18.) She did not believe that Mr. Fukuji would reoffend. (PSI, p.18.)
She also stated, “I believe he will fight the battle to stay clean and sober and I will support him
everyday.” (PSI, p.18.) Mr. Fukuji’s ex-wife wrote, “We all want what’s best for him. We all
want him safe. We all want him happy. We all believe he needs help first and foremost.” (PSI,
p.19.)
The general manager at Kodiak America, Mr. Fukuji’s former employer, stated that
Mr. Fukuji “was responsible, qualified, honest and dependable for almost all of the time he was
employed.”

(PSI, p.20.) Per the general manager, after Mr. Fukuji’s divorce, he became

involved with drugs and a local motorcycle gang, and his deteriorating work performance and
“incidences of anger and violence toward” another employee led to Kodiak firing him. (See PSI,
p.20.) The general manager wrote, “Please note that it was with much sadness that we did
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this. . . . His dismissal was a significant loss to our company and he was hard [to] replace.”
(PSI, p.20.) Kodiak’s “hope for Collin is that after he has paid for the consequences of his
behavior and . . . his drug problem has been successfully treated that he will emerge as a wiser
man, back to the person he used to be. Following that completion we would certainly consider
rehiring him.” (PSI, p.21.)
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors, the
district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Thus, Mr. Fukuji
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction when it imposed his
two consecutive unified sentences of five years, with one year fixed. The district court should
have instead followed Mr. Fukuji’s recommendations by placing him on probation.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Fukuji respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1st day of July, 2021.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BPM/eas
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